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1	Introduction
On	the	2nd	of	December	2014,	the	District	Antimafia	Prosecutors	in	Rome	revealed	the	findings	of	operation	“Mondo	di	Mezzo”	(World	in	Between)	by	arresting	38	people,	among	which	Massimo	Carminati,	sentenced	to	20
years	of	prison	for	its	recidivist	involvement	in	a	number	of	criminal	activities	(such	as	extortion,	loan-sharking,	usury,	etc.).	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	present	and	evaluate	the	criminal	career	of	Carminati,	who,	well	known
to	Italian	authorities,	has	a	past	with	right	wing	terrorism	and	organised	crime	groups	in	the	capital	city	of	Rome	(Mazzeo,	2015;	Martone,	2016b).	Other	44	people	were	arrested	in	June	2015	within	the	same	investigation.	The	group
led	by	Carminati	and	his	associates	has	been	named	“Mafia	Capitale”.1	 In	 July	2017,	 as	 the	 first	 degree	 trial	 ended	with	41	 convictions	 for	 crimes	as	disparate	 as	 corruption,	 loan	 sharking,	 trafficking	of	 favours	 and	 influences,
obstruction	of	justice	and	of	public	administration,	the	Tribunal	in	Rome	(hereinafter	‘the	Tribunal’)	argued	that	Mafia	Capitale	is	certainly	an	unlawful	association	–	characterised	by	organised	corruption	and	serious	crimes	-	but	it
cannot	be	considered	a	“mafia-type”	association.2	The	Antimafia	Prosecutors	appealed	the	sentence	against	19	defendants	in	December	2017.	The	Appeal	trial	confirmed	the	thesis	of	the	Prosecutors	and	the	mafia	status	of	the	group
in	September2,	018.3
Since	 its	 inception,	 the	case	has	attracted	a	 lot	of	attention	 from	media	and	scholars	 for	 its	peculiar	 setting	–	 the	capital	city	of	Rome	–	and	because	of	 its	extremely	 successful,	 and	 for	a	 long	 time	unpunished,	 criminal
character	(Vannucci,	2016).
Relying	on	judicial	documents	including	arrest	warrants,	interceptions,	the	first-degree	sentence	and	its	motivations,	and	the	case	for	appeal,	and	including	two	interviews	with	the	key	Antimafia	prosecutors	on	the	case,	this
paper	will	perform	a	content	analysis	first	(for	a	preliminary	coding)	and	a	discourse	analysis	afterwards,	of	the	legal	battle	between	the	Antimafia	Prosecutors	and	the	first	degree	Tribunal	in	the	recognition	and	legal	qualification	of
Mafia	Capitale.	A	total	of	6500	pages	of	documents	constitute	the	data	considered	for	this	paper.	The	two	interviews	only	had	the	scope	to	clarify	some	of	the	legal	choices	and	technicalities	of	the	case	and	should	be	considered	as
supporting	data	to	the	documents.	By	assessing	how	legal	constructivism	has	worked	in	this	case,	this	study	fundamentally	reconsiders	the	core	of	the	theoretical	frameworks	that	-	at	both	sociological	and	legal	levels	–	define	the
phenomenon	of	mafias.	An	assessment	of	the	debates	in	the	course	of	the	Mafia	Capitale	first	trial	reveals	a	profound	revolution	of	the	theoretical	foundations	of	the	mafia	concept;	the	battle	is,	in	this	sense,	not	just	a	legal	one,	but
also	a	conceptual	one	with	repercussions	beyond	this	trial.
This	paper	will	ultimately	argue	that	the	legal	interpretation	given	by	the	Antimafia	prosecutors	and	confirmed	in	the	Appeal	trial	appears	more	aligned	with	criminological	conceptualisations	of	mafias,	whose	actions	need	to
be	qualified	as	set	of	methods	and	set	of	behaviours	(Sergi,	2017b;	Sciarrone	and	Storti,	2014).	These	concepts	better	describe	modern	manifestations	of	organised	crime	groups,	seeking	both	power	and	profit,	and	using	both	violence
and	systemic	corruption,	as	in	Italy	so	abroad.	The	thesis	of	this	paper	is	not	entirely	an	original	one.	Other	scholars	have	already	looked	at	this	case	as	paradigmatic	of	a	very	profound	set	of	changes	currently	happening	within	Italian
jurisprudence	when	it	comes	to	unlinking	mafia	associations	from	the	geographical	and	structural	elements	usually	attributed	to	them	(Visconti,	2015b,	2015c;	Ciccarello,	2016;	Manzini,	2016).	Within	these	studies,	Mafia	Capitale	has
been	defined	an	“idealtype”	case	(Ciccarello,	2016)	because	it	represents	the	possibility	to	reconsider	the	debate	on	mafia	offences	ideally,	as	well	as	representing	a	very	specific	case,	which	might	be	difficult	to	generalise.	This	current
Constructing	the	mafia	concept	on	the	bench.	The	legal	battles	in	the	‘Mafia	Capitale’	case	in	Rome
Anna	Sergi
asergi@essex.ac.uk
Criminology,	Department	of	Sociology,	University	of	Essex,	Wivenhoe	Park,	CO43SQ,	Colchester,	UK
Abstract
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study,	aimed	at	an	international	audience,	aims	at	contributing	to	the	current	debate	with	an	analysis	of	the	legal	discourse	that	shows	how	legal	constructivism	within	current	debates	in	Italian	jurisprudence	actually	work	in	practice.
2	Framing	mafia	and	organised	crime:	an	outlook	to	the	Italian	legal	context
The	terms	‘organised	crime’	and	‘mafia’	are	often	considered	to	be	interchangeable,	especially	in	public	and	media	discourses	around	the	world	(Whithorn,	2014).	In	Italian	institutional	discourses,	these	terms	overlap	(Sergi,
2015a).	However,	scholars	and	policy	makers	tend	to	be	more	nuanced	in	the	way	mafia-type	organised	crime	differs	from	non-mafia/other	organised	crime,	even	though	differences	might	be	more	fictional	than	substantial	(Von	Lampe,
2016).
These	two	phenomena	have	been	approached	from	various	disciplinary	points	of	view.	Seminal	studies	have	stressed	the	importance	of	understanding	criminal	groups	within	the	culture	and	the	socio-psychological	traits	of
their	territories	of	origin,	through	analysis	of	families,	communities,	trust	and	ethnic	solidarity	(Hess	and	Osers,	1973;	Schneider	and	Schneider,	2005;	Paoli,	2003).	Next	to	socio-cultural	studies,	we	find	socio-economic	studies,	which
understand	organised	crime	as	a	product	of	the	liberal	market	(Mattina,	2011;	Ardizzi	et	al.,	2012;	Shapland	and	Ponsaers,	2009),	 thus	opportunistic	 in	nature	and	oriented	 to	maximisation	of	profits.	 Increasingly,	 the	strength	of
traditional,	Southern	Italian,	mafias	–	the	Sicilian	Cosa	Nostra	(or	simply	Sicilian	mafia,	the	Calabrian	‘ndrangheta	and	the	Campanian	camorra	–	has	been	identified	in	their	mixed	nature:	embedded	in	their	original	culture,	but	also
crucially	entrepreneurial	 in	 illegal	and	legal	markets	(Sergi	and	Lavorgna,	2016;	Lupo,	2011).	Studies	on	mafias	and	organised	crime	have	also	evolved	to	 include	organisational	studies	and	network-based	studies	 that	enrich	and
complete	both	cultural	and	economic	approaches	(Calderoni	et	al.,	2017;	Sciarrone,	2014;	Catino,	2019).
Crucially,	public	corruption	might	be	one	of	the	differentiating	factors	between	the	two	phenomena.	It	has	been	argued	that	the	difference	between	“mafia-type”	unlawful	association	and	“other”	unlawful	associations,	is	in	the
ability	to	systematically	corrupt	and	infiltrate	various	facets	of	public	and	political	life	(CSD,	2010;	Holmes,	2010;	Sciarrone	and	Storti,	2016;	Mete	and	Sciarrone,	2016;	Sciarrone,	2016).	In	other	words,	whereas	organised	crime	is
often	paired	with	either	occasional,	ad-hoc,	corruption	or	long-term	usually	sectorial	(finance,	 justice,	health	sectors)	 infiltration	in	public	administration	(CSD,	2010),	mafia	groups	–successful	ones	-	are	more	likely	to	climb	up	to
political	powers	(Vannucci,	2001,	2016).	This	is	essentially	because	“other”	organised	crime	groups,	generally	speaking,	aim	at	financial	gains,	while	mafia	groups	aim	at	both	financial	gains	and	connivance	with,	and	acquisition	of,
power	 (Sergi,	 2017b).	 The	 environments	 where	 criminal	 groups	 operate	will	 often	mould	 the	 capacity	 and	 reach	 of	 criminal	 groups	 into	 political	 circles.	 In	 societies,	 like	 for	 example	 certain	 areas	 of	 the	 South	 of	 Italy,	 where
communities’	ties	have	developed	across	clientelistic	and	familial	bonds	(Piselli	and	Arrighi,	1985),	the	overlapping	of	interests	among	entrepreneurs,	politicians	and	mafia	affiliates	–	for	acquisition	of	power	and	money	–	is	expected
(Dalla	Chiesa,	2010;	Sciarrone	and	Storti,	2016).
It	 is	 in	 the	 law,	 in	article	416-bis	of	 the	 Italian	Penal	Code	 (i.e.	 the	mafia	offence),	 that	we	 find	 the	specification	of	mafia-type	associations	as	more	serious	 (even	 for	 sentencing	purposes)	and	qualified	 forms	of	unlawful
associations.	“Other”	organised	crime	is	covered	by	article	416	of	the	Penal	Code	instead	and,	compared	to	the	mafia	offence,	lacks	the	employment	of	the	mafia	method,	including	political	ties.	In	fact,	article	416-bis	requires	a	certain
number	of	“ingredients”	to	“make”	a	mafia	group	(Morosini,	2010).	A	mafia	type	criminal	association	exists	when	a	group	of	people	systemically	employ	the	“mafia	method”:
“When	the	participants	 take	advantage	of	 the	 intimidating	power	of	 the	association	and	of	 the	resulting	conditions	of	submission	and	silence	 [omertà]	 to	commit	criminal	offences,	 to	manage	or	 in	any	way	control,	either	directly	or
indirectly,	economic	activities,	concessions,	authorisations,	public	contracts	and	services,	or	to	obtain	unlawful	profits	or	advantages	for	themselves	or	for	any	other	persons,	or	with	a	view	to	prevent	or	limit	the	freedom	to	vote,	or	to	get
votes	for	themselves	or	for	other	persons	on	the	occasion	of	an	election”.
The	interpretation	of	the	mafia	method,	how	it	manifests	and	how	it	can	be	proved,	is	the	core	of	the	split	between	prosecutors	and	judges	across	many	Antimafia	cases.	The	Supreme	Court	(Court	of	Cassation)	clarified	in20154
that	the	mafia	method	is	“the	use	of	the	intimidatory	power	that	originates	from	the	very	existence	of	the	organisation	paired	with	a	diffuse	subjection	in	the	social	environment	and	therefore	a	general	condition	of	omertà”.
To	qualify	a	criminal	group	as	a	mafia	group	is	not	an	easy	task	especially	outside	of	the	territories	of	traditional	mafia	presence,	to	which	the	norm	is	historically	attached	to	(Balsamo,	2016;	Visconti,	2015b;	Ciccarello,	2016).
In	this	context,	the	main	challenge	for	the	prosecutors	in	the	Mafia	Capitale	case	was	to	prove	the	ingredients	of	article	416-bis,	mafia-type	unlawful	association,	for	the	criminal	organisation	led	by	Massimo	Carminati	especially	by
using	paragraph	8	of	the	norm,	which	applies	to	“any	other	criminal	organisation,	whichever	their	local	title”.5
3	Legal	constructivism	in	mafia	cases
Mafia	Capitale	has	been	considered	both	the	challenge	and	the	opportunity	for	legal	and	social	constructivism	of	the	mafia	phenomenon	in	Italy	and	abroad	(Dalla	Chiesa,	2015;	Sergi,	2016b;	Ciccarello,	2016).	Mafia	Capitale
has	been	presented	by	the	Italian	Antimafia	prosecutors	as	an	autochthonous	mafia	organisation	born	and	bred	in	Rome,	with	links	to	all	Italian	major	criminal	organisations	in	the	capital	city,	but	eventually	autonomous	and	with	its
own	mandate	and	reach	into	public	administration	and	politics	(De	Bonis,	2015;	Mete	and	Sciarrone,	2016).	As	said,	the	first-degree	trial,	which	ended	in	July	2017	with	41	convictions,	did	not	confirm	that	the	criminal	group	acted
with	the	mafia	method	even	though	it	was	confirmed	that	the	unlawful	association	was	involved	in	systemic	corruption,	extortion,	loan-sharking,	money	laundering,	collusive	tendering	and	trafficking	of	favours.6	It	became	very	clear
that	there	was	a	split	in	the	way	the	prosecutors,	on	one	side,	and	the	Tribunal,	on	the	other,	interpreted	criminal	law	on	mafia	and	organised	crime	in	Italy.	This	split	was	overturn	again	in	the	Appeal	trial	in	September	2018	that
confirmed	the	thesis	of	the	prosecutors;	the	trial	is	not	over	yet	as	defence	lawyers	have	remanded	the	appeal	sentence	to	be	considered	by	the	Supreme	Court	for	rebuttal	or	confirmation.
Criminal	law	expresses	and	influences	social	meanings	and,	by	qualifying	and	interpreting	behaviours,	it	does	represent	mechanisms	of	both	legal	and	social	constructions	(Dworkin,	1986).	Criminal	law	principles	can	facilitate
a	 criminological	 understanding	of	 complex	phenomena,	 like	mafias,	 embedded	 in	 their	 historical	meanings	 (Melossi,	2001;	Morosini,	 2010).	 Furthermore,	 all	 legal	 constructions	 are	 bound	 to	 consider	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 the
phenomena	they	seek	to	define,	while	still	maintaining	logic,	integrity,	coherence	and	continuity	in	theoretical	approaches,	in	the	same	way	social	inquiry	cannot	dismiss	social	theory	that	drives	its	methods	and	analysis	of	new	or
newly	approached	phenomena	(Weisberg,	2003).	Dworkin's	(1977)	approach	for	the	constructivist	interpretation	of	the	law	further	specifies	that	judges	need	to	possess	adequate	‘conceptions’	to	interpret	the	law.	To	have	‘conceptions’
is	 to	have	“just”,	 shared	and	 recognisable	ways	of	 constructing	 things	 in	one's	mind	by	 thinking	about	or	 interpreting	 them.	Adequate	conceptions	are	 the	basis	of	 legal	 constructions	 in	paradigm	cases	 –	 situations	about	which
interpretive	agreement	is	ready	to	hand	and	consolidated.	In	non-paradigm	cases	(hard	cases),	according	to	Dworkin's	school	of	legal	constructivism,	judges	begin	with	what	can	be	agreed	upon	in	paradigm	cases,	and	then	construct
or	build	upon	this	foundation.	In	the	case	at	hand,	judgements	on	“traditional”	Southern	mafia	groups	within	article	416-bis	can	be	(to	a	certain	extent	and	when	in	the	South)	considered	paradigm	cases,	while	Mafia	Capitale	qualifies
as	a	hard	case.
One	of	the	ways	in	which	constructivist	mechanisms	can	work	in	hard	cases,	is	by	using	Rawls’	(1974;	1971)	method	of	reflective	equilibrium.	This	method	implies	departing	from	a	sense	of	justice	which	the	majority	shares;
when	judgements	collide	–	e.g.	in	hard	cases	–	beliefs	are	adjusted	by	negotiating	an	equilibrium,	which	allows	judges	to	provide	practical	guidance	and	to	eventually	reach	an	innovative	verdict	without	losing	the	sense	of	justice	that
others	share.	This	negotiation	will	balance	the	law	in	books	and	the	law	in	practice.
In	criminal	law	this	is	even	more	necessary,	even	in	jurisdictions	like	Italy	where	judges	‘do	not	make	the	law’,	but	still	have	a	very	crucial	role	in	its	interpretation	(Antolisei,	2008).	In	Italy,	the	criminalisation	of	mafias	has
been	considered	as	sociologically	driven,	 in	the	sense	that	 the	sociological	evolution	and	representations	of	 the	phenomenon	has	 influenced	 its	 institutional	perception	and	eventually	 its	 legal	construction	(Sergi,	2017b;	Martone,
2016a).
The	mafia	method	–	intended	as	a	“collective	behavioural	requirement”	(Sergi,	2017b:	94)	of	planning	group	criminal	activities,	is	essential	to	charge	article	416-bis	of	the	Criminal	code	as	it	differentiates	mafias	from	“other”
forms	of	organised	crime	(Ciccarello,	2016;	Manzini,	2016).	Hard	cases	of	article	416-bis,	like	Mafia	Capitale	or	migrating	mafia	clans	in	the	rest	of	Italy	or	new	or	foreign	criminal	groups	(Visconti,	2015a,	2015b;	Sparagna,	2015)
require	constant	negotiation	of	justice	through	the	method	of	reflective	equilibrium.	For	other	forms	of	organised	crime	activities,	the	offence	in	article	416	of	the	Criminal	code	–	unlawful	association	(“other”	organised	crime)	-	is	used,
often	a	residual	and	fall-back	choice	for	the	judges	(Sergi,	2016a)	as	the	result	of	this	negotiation.
At	trial,	in	fact,	it	often	becomes	very	difficult	to	prove	the	mafia	method,	also	because	of	the	burden	of	its	sociological	connotations.	For	example,	notwithstanding	the	importance	of	territorial	sovereignty	and	organisational
features	to	understand	organised	crime	and	mafias,	neither	control	of	the	territory	nor	hierarchy	requirements	of	the	mafia	offence	(Ciccarello,	2016;	Dalla	Chiesa,	2015).	At	 trial,	however,	both	are	often	considered	as	necessary
manifestations	of	the	mafia	organisation	and	method,	a	sign	that	the	interpretation	of	the	mafia	offence	is	still	linked	to	its	historical	and	sociological	birth	-	the	fight	against	the	Sicilian	mafia	-	(Sergi,	2016b)	and	therefore	its	legal
construction	is	bound	to	paradigmatic	cases	whose	boundaries	of	interpretation	and	construction	have	already	been	negotiated.
Finally,	as	reminded	above,	a	discourse	on	the	criminalisation	of	mafias	cannot	avoid	touching	upon	the	peculiar	relationship	that	exists	between	mafia	groups	and	corruption.	The	mafia	norm	absorbes	the	concept	of	corruption
(Turone,	2008).	Whenever	 there	 is	mafia	 there	 is	a	 risk	of	 (systemic/endemic)	corruption:	 the	mafia	method	subsumes	the	ability	 to	corrupt	and	to	govern	 (Sergi,	2015b,	2017b;	Dagnes	et	al.,	2018;	 Sciarrone,	 2011).	 Conversely,
corruption	itself	can	manifest	in	many	different	scenarios,	public	and	private	ones,	individual	or	corporate	(Ruggiero,	1985)	beyond	organised	crime	and	the	mafia	method.	The	legal	construction	of	cases	where	a)	criminal	activities	are
aimed	at	both	profit	and	political	influence	or	power	(which	suggests	a	mafia	behaviour)	but	b)	fear,	intimidation	and	omertà	are	not	easily	proved	because	violent	acts	are	missing	or	residual	(which	makes	it	difficult	to	prove	the	mafia
offence)	and	c)	systemic	corruption	seems	to	be	the	main	tool	to	establish	the	groups’	financial	and	political	powers,	sits	unwell	within	the	boundaries	of	Italian	law	(Vannucci,	2016).	As	this	is	the	construction	of	Mafia	Capitale	as
argued	by	the	prosecutors,	it	is	clear	to	see	how	Mafia	Capitale	explodes	the	limits	of	the	mafia	offence,	thus	becoming	a	hard	case	for	legal	constructivism.
What	follows	is	a	deconstruction	of	the	mafia	method	as	exemplified	in	the	legal	battle	for	Mafia	Capitale:	on	one	side	the	expansionist	positions	of	the	Antimafia	prosecutors,	on	the	other	side	the	conservative	positions	of	the
Tribunal	for	the	first	degree	trial.
3.1	The	legal	battle	in	Mafia	Capitale
See	table	1
4	The	different	worlds	of	Mafia	Capitale
The	quintessential	difference	between	 the	 thesis	of	 the	prosecutors	and	 the	 legal	 construction	of	 the	Tribunal,	pivots	around	 the	qualification	of	Mafia	Capitale	as	either	one	–	 as	 the	prosecutors	argue	 -	 or	 two	different
associations	–	as	found	instead	by	the	Tribunal.	From	this	crucial	difference	essentially	come	all	the	others,	especially	in	terms	of	the	mafia	qualification:	if	the	criminal	group	known	as	Mafia	Capitale	is	not	a	unified	one,	it	follows	that
the	whole	thesis	of	Mafia	Capitale	being	a	mafia-type	organisation	falls	apart.	We	can,	however,	clarify	this	further,	by	looking	at	points	of	interpretative	convergence	and	divergence	on	intercepted	materials	as	well	as,	more	generally,
at	the	nature	of	ties	within	the	different	groups	that	make	Mafia	Capitale.
4.1	The	underworld
First	of	all,	it	is	the	opinion	of	all	authorities	-	Antimafia	prosecutors,	the	Tribunal	and	an	Inquisitive	Commission	-	which	scrutinised	offices	and	departments	of	the	municipality	of	Rome	to	evaluate	mafia	penetration	after	the
arrests	 in	2014	–	 that	Mafia	Capitale's	success	was	 linked	to	a	specific	strategy	and	to	the	personality	of	Massimo	Carminati	 (Vannucci,	2016).	Carminati	himself	during	an	 intercepted	conversation,29	 reveals	 the	existence	and	the
ultimate	aim	of	this	criminal	group:
“(…)	It	is	the	theory	of	the	world	in-between	mate	…	there	are	…	how	to	say	…	the	living	above	and	the	dead	below	and	we	are	in	the	middle	(…)	a	world	in	between	where	everybody	meets	and	you	ask	…	how	the	hell	is	this
possible	that	tomorrow	I	can	be	at	dinner	with	Berlusconi30	(…)	you	understand	…	all	meet,	every	social	class.	It's	not	a	question	of	social	class,	it's	about	merit,	right?	(	…)	in	between	also	the	person	in	the	upperworld	has	interest	for
someone	in	the	underworld	to	do	something	for	them	that	no	one	else	would	do”.
As	noted	by	the	District	Antimafia	Prosecutors,	it	has	always	been	in	Carminati's	nature	“the	ability	to	interact	with	different	realities	and	to	be	at	the	same	time	emancipated	from	them	and	their	limits,	operating	always	in	autonomous	and
transversal	ways”.31	Interceptions	reveal	how	Carminati	-	in	between	the	“living	ones	above”	(entrepreneurs,	public	administrators	and	politicians)	and	the	“dead	ones	below”	(street	criminals)	-	has	been	the	real	engine	behind	the	complex
group	of	relationships	and	ties	on	which	the	whole	group	was	based.	According	to	the	Prosecutors,	the	complexity	of	this	system,	which	touches	all	strata	of	society,	from	below	to	above,	is	typical	of	mafia	groups	in	particular	because
Carminati	used	the	vastity	of	this	complexity	to	intimidate	(he	says,	in	an	attempt	to	corrupt	that	sounds	as	a	threat	or	a	warning:	“if	I	know	that	someone	else	does	it	for	you	…	that	would	be	unpleasant”32).	Different	position	holds	the
Tribunal:	there	is	no	proof	that	“this	criminal	project	was	known	to	all	the	others	in	the	groups	or	that	they	agreed	and	approved	it”.33
The	ties	in	the	underworld	of	the	Mafia	Capitale	group	are	of	three	categories,	which	reflect	the	composite	nature	of	criminality	in	the	region	of	Lazio	and	the	city	of	Rome	(Martone,	2017a):	Carminati's	friends	and	associates
mainly	from	the	years	of	the	criminal	mafia-type	group	known	as	Banda	della	Magliana	and	the	far	right	armed	militia,	involved	in	extortion	and	debts	collection;	street	criminals,	such	as	robbers,	who	are	helpful	to	secure	control	over
different	areas	of	the	city;	other	criminal	groups,	including	mafia	groups,	operating	in	the	capital	city,	who	are	at	the	same	time	partners	and	competitors	for	the	group.	Mostly,	these	ties	are	opportunistic,	seeking	mutual	support	when
needed	–	as	explained	in	an	interception	-	for	“certain	things	to	do	in	the	capital	city	…	for	example	kill	someone	(…)	have	territorial	support,	being	facilitated	in	the	acquisition	of	weapons	as	well	as	getting	alerts	if	someone	had	not	paid”.34	For	the
prosecutors,	the	derivation	from	the	Banda	della	Magliana	and	the	existence	of	a	composite	underworld	able	to	use	violence	and	to	enforce	debt	collection	if	needed,	is	essential	to	the	reputation	of	the	organisation	(Ciccarello,	2016;
Martone,	2017b).	As	seen	in	Table	1,	the	prosecutors	also	consider	fundamental	the	relationships	with	more	established	mafia	groups;	particularly	relevant	according	to	the	prosecutors	is	the	recognition	by	the	‘ndrangheta	–	Italy's	most
powerful	mafia	group	(Sergi	and	Lavorgna,	2016),	encapsulated	 in	 the	 interception	of	an	 individual	affiliated	to	 the	 ‘ndrangheta	but	also	embedded	 in	 the	Mafia	Capitale	group:	“down	 there,	 they	 [the	 ‘ndrangheta]	 rule,	here	we	 [Mafia
Capitale]	rule”.35	The	fact	that	established	mafia-type	criminal	groups,	like	the	Mancuso	clan	of	the	‘ndrangheta	for	example,	choose	to	do	business	with	the	Mafia	Capitale	group	is	essentially	an	endorsement	of	the	group's	capability
and	reach	(Prefetto	di	Roma,	2015).	For	the	Tribunal,	instead,	the	links	with	historical	criminal	groups	in	the	capital	city	is	only	relevant	to	boost	the	reputation	of	Carminati,	and	him	alone.	In	addition,	according	to	the	Tribunal,	the
group	in	the	underworld	mostly	constitutes	an	autonomous	unlawful	association,	separated	from	the	main	activities	the	groups	carries	out,	especially	the	systemic	corruption	of	public	administration.	In	particular	the	Tribunal	finds
that	“the	proceeds	of	crime	are	confined	to	the	group	[the	criminal	group	handling	extortion	and	debt	collection]	and	never	destined,	not	even	partially,	to	support	higher	organisational	levels,	as	it	used	to	happen	for	example	also	in	the	Banda	della
Magliana”.36
Table	1	Presents	direct	quotes	from	both	the	prosecutorial	documents	(arrest	warrants,	interceptions	and	appeal	decree)	and	the	sentence	and	motivations	drafted	by	the	Tribunal	in	the	first	trial	for	Mafia	Capitale.
The	table	constructs	9	themes	of	divergence	in	the	legal	interpretation,	through	which	the	construction	of	Mafia	Capitale	starts	appearing	as	a	powerful	and	composite	criminal	group,	heavily	invested	in	extortion	and
debt	collection	as	well	as	systemic	corruption	and	infiltration	into	public	affairs	and	contracts,	with	two	central	figures,	Massimo	Carminati	and	Salvatore	Buzzi.
alt-text:	Table	1
Antimafia	Prosecutors First-Degree	Tribunal
The	criminal “An	unlawful	and	evolved	group,	which	uses	intimidation	originating	also	from	the	criminal	past	of “An	aggregation	of	individuals	committing	an	indeterminate	amount	of	crimes,	but	in	two
organisation some	of	its	primary	members	(…)	A	criminal	organisation	so	dangerous	and	multifaceted	that
operates	(…)	primarily	in	the	world	in	between	-	a	place	where	–	because	of	the	authoritative
character	and	the	power	of	Mafia	Capitale,	criminal	synergies	between	the	upperworld	–	made	of
white	collar	criminals,	entrepreneurs	and	institutions	–	and	the	underworld	–	made	of	robbers,	drug
traffickers	and	arms	dealers,	are	successfully	maintained”7
different	organisations:	one	aimed	at	loan-sharking	and	debt	collection	through	extortion	and
the	other	aimed	at	the	acquisition	of	public	contracts	through	corruption	(also	realised	via
money	generated	through	false	invoicing)	and	collusive	tendering”8
Activities	of
the
organisation
“The	core	business	of	Mafia	Capitale	is	the	commission	of	all	the	illegal	activities	of	article	416-bis
[mafia	offence].	Among	them,	the	most	frequent	are	serious	‘common’	crimes,	usually	through
violence,	but	mostly	the	infiltration	in	the	economic,	political	and	institutional	spheres	and	the	illegal
acquisition	of	public	contracts”.9
“The	activities	of	loan-sharking	and	extortion	(…)	are	and	remain	a	separate	matter	from	the
criminal	activities	against	the	public	administration	(…)	It	is	not	possible	to	sustain	that	the
[second]	association	of	Buzzi	[involved	in	public	administration	corruption]	knew	and
approved	of	the	people	and	the	methods	of	the	primary	organisation	doing	extortions	and
debt	collection	or	even	considered	them	available	to	them	if	needed”.10
The	mafia
method
“The	association	manifests	the	indicators	of	‘mafiosity’	(…):	secrecy,	hierarchy,	respect	of	the
hierarchy,	the	mafia	method	of	intimidation	used	to	control	companies	and	entire	economic	and
public	contracts,	the	diffused	sense	of	omertà	deriving	from	all	of	this,	a	criminal	plan	as	required	by
article	416-bis	[…]	thanks	to	efficient	corruptive	actions”.11
“It	needs	to	be	concluded	that	there	are	two	associations,	each	of	which	lacking	mafia
characteristics,	both	autonomous	or	derivative	[from	other	groups].12
Intimidation
&	Reputation
“The	syndicate	named	Mafia	Capitale	has	built	its	power	of	intimidation	and	its	criminal	reputation
(so	called	accumulation	of	criminal	capital)	on	one	side	through	the	realisation	of	violent	crimes	and
threats,	and,	on	the	other	side,	thanks	to	the	role	that	its	boss	[Carminati]	and	his	partners
historically	played	in	the	underworld	of	the	city”.13
“The	events	show	the	power	of	intimidation	of	Carminati,	in	single	acts,	aimed	at	his
counterparts.	It	is,	however,	an	occasional	and	direct	pressure	he	exercises;	it	is	not	the	kind
of	intimidation	needed	to	qualify	the	mafia	offence,	for	which	intimidation	has	to	determine
an	enduring	state	of	grave	fear,	leading	to	the	commission	of	the	ordered	actions.	Events
reveal	the	absence	of	a	consolidated	and	diffused	criminal	reputation	connected	to	a	mafia-
type	association”.14
Violence “The	‘reserve	of	violence’	[that	we	have	in	this	case]	is	a	potential	use	of	violence	by	a	visible	and
concrete	organisation,	which	through	this	potential	use,	exhibits	the	power	of	intimidation	of	a
mafia-type	association”.15
“It	is	impossible	to	consider	that	here	exists	a	‘reserve	of	violence’,	which	is	something	on
‘derivative’	mafia	groups	can	claim	as	they	can	benefit	from	the	intimidation	already
generated	by	the	structure	of	origin”16
Omertà	&
Subjection
“It	is	particularly	important	that,	notwithstanding	the	pressures	to	individuals	to	deliver	what	was
asked	of	them,	none	of	them	decided	to	report	it	[the	intimidation]	to	the	authorities.	Individuals	that
in	single	occasions	were	subjected	to	acts	of	intimidation,	in	fact,	recognised	that	[the	perpetrator]
was	evidently	part	of	a	syndicate	with	an	invincible	capacity	to	intimidate,	which	imposed	the	silence
of	the	victims.	The	violent	acts	against	the	victims	and	their	condition	of	subjection	and	omertà	are
clear	indicators	of	the	capacity	to	intimidate	originating	from	the	strength	of	the	associative	bond”.17
“The	acts	of	intimidation	that	pressured	individual	debtors	to	pay	or	accept	disadvantageous
terms	for	re-negotiation	certainly	led	these	victims	to	feel	a	grave	state	of	concern	and	fear.
These	acts,	however,	were	directed	only	to	achieve	the	specific	results	wanted	and	could	not
determine,	in	the	community,	an	enduring	state	of	grave	fear,	so	known	and	diffused	that	–
following	acts	of	intimidations	-	it	could	produce	a	generalised	condition	of	subjection	and
omertà	in	the	territorial	context,	neither	in	the	whole	urban	territory	nor	in	a
neighbourhood”.18
Control	of
territory
“In	an	interpretative	perspective,	(…)	It	has	been	excluded	that	the	power/strength	of	intimidation
should	translate	in	the	control	of	a	determined	territorial	area.	(…)	The	norm	[mafia	offence,	article
416-bis]	applies	also	to	organisations	which,	even	without	controlling	all	those	who	live	and	work	in	a
territory,	nevertheless	direct	to	a	specific	community	their	criminal	activities,	through	the	mafia
method”.19
“The	control	over	certain	territorial	areas,	even	if	it	is	not	a	constitutive	element	of	the	norm
[mafia	offence,	article	416-bis],	is	nevertheless	an	implicit	requirement,	because	on	the
territory	we	measure	the	criminal	power	of	an	organisation	and	its	capacity	to	determine
subjection	and	omertà”.20
Systemic
Corruption
“The	power	of	intimidation	of	the	association	was	acquired	through	the	creation	of	an	organisational
structure	that	thanks	to	political	proximity,	abuse	of	power	and	systemic	corruption,	can	interfere	in
the	allocation	of	bids,	in	the	release	of	licenses,	in	the	control	of	public	sectors	or	public	institutions
at	the	point	that	competition	is	annulled	and	initiatives	external	to	the	syndicate	are	void”.21
“The	necessity	to	guarantee	work	for	his	social	cooperatives	led	Buzzi	to	establish	and
maintain	relationships	with	politicians	and	in	particular	with	the	council	of	Rome,	main
outsourcer	of	services	to	the	cooperatives	(…)	The	facts	demonstrate	that,	beyond	the
commission	of	single	crimes	–	an	association	had	been	created	with	the	permanent	purpose
of	realising	an	undetermined	number	of	acts	of	corruption	and	bid	rigging.	(…)	that,	by
obeying	to	a	logic	of	systemic	corruption,	managed	to	guarantee	profits”.22
Relationships
with	other
criminal
organisations
“[Mafia	Capitale]	represents	the	end	point	of	other	organisations	born	from	the	far-right	militia,
which	have	evolved,	partially,	in	the	phenomenon	called	‘Banda	della	Magliana’	[between	1970s	and
1990s]	then	mutating	into	Mafia	Capitale”.23
–
“The	relationships	with	other	criminal	organisations	cannot	be	considered	exclusive	contacts	of
Carminati	alone,	(…).24
“The	support	promised	by	Buzzi	to	the	election	of	Alemanno	[former	mayor	of	Rome]	was	founded	in
his	privileged	relationship	with	members	of	the	‘ndrangheta	with	whom	he	demonstrated	to	interact
as	an	equal	(…)25	directly	by	the	clan	Mancuso	and	it	was	a	sign	of	a	recognised	reciprocity	between
‘ndrangheta	and	Mafia	Capitale”26
“It	cannot	be	said	that	the	group	led	by	Carminati	has	its	roots	in	the	underworld	of	1980s
and	in	the	Banda	della	Magliana	(…):	it	appears	obvious	how	they	differ	in	terms	of	business
and	relationships	with	others	(…)	with	politics	and	entrepreneurs	(…)	The	connection
between	the	two	groups	is	only	subjective,	in	the	person	of	Carminati”.27
–
“It	appears	uncertain	a	link	–	effective,	current	and	significant	–	for	the	group	in	Rome	(…)
with	the	‘ndrangheta	clan	Mancuso	(…)	for	the	involvement	within	the	criminal	plan	of	the
cooperatives	led	by	Buzzi”.28
4.2	The	upperworld
When	it	comes	to	the	upperworld,	it	is	central	to	the	prosecutors'	thesis	the	idea	that	the	strength	of	Mafia	Capitale	lies	in	the	ability	to	accumulate	and	employ/exploit	social	capital	in	the	underworld	as	well	as	establishing
agreements	with	institutional	capital	-	individuals	in	different	roles	in	society,	i.e.	entrepreneurs,	politicians,	professionals,	public	officials	(Vannucci,	2016).	As	Mazzeo	(2015:	47)	has	noticed,	in	addition	to	the	“black	charisma”	of	Massimo
Carminati	Mafia	Capitale	pivots	around	the	“red	dominus”37	Salvatore	Buzzi.	Buzzi	is	the	alter	ego	of	Carminati	–	whom	he	met	in	prison	-	in	the	upperworld,	a	world	he	has	access	to	because	of	his	closeness	to,	and	good	reputation
within,	the	political	left	wing	of	the	region.	The	link	between	a	right	wing	extremist	as	Carminati	is	considered	and	a	left	wing	sympathiser	as	Salvatore	Buzzi	is	peculiar	to	say	the	least.	Nevertheless,	their	relationship	is	certainly
successful	as	profit-oriented	and	not	 ideological	 in	nature.	According	to	the	prosecutors,	Buzzi	and	Carminati	are	business	partners	and	Buzzi	deals	with	the	economic	aspects	of	 that	partnership.	He	 is	also	 in	charge	of	keeping,
renewing	and	fostering	the	relationships	with	politicians	and	most	of	all	administrators	and	public	officials.	 In	an	 intercepted	conversation38	while	 in	a	car	with	Giovanni	Campennì	 -	 the	entrepreneur	charged	of	mafia	association
because	considered	an	emissary	of	the	Mancuso	clan	of	the	‘ndrangheta	–	Buzzi	says:
“You	have	to	be	good	at	it,	as	our	cooperative	lives	through	politics;	the	work	I	do	a	lot	of	people	do,	so	why	[choosing]	me?	I	sponsor	newspapers,	advertisement,	and	events.	I	pay	for	secretaries,	for	dinners,	for	banners.	On	Monday	I	have
a	dinner	worth	20,000	euros	you	know	…	this	is	the	period	you	invest	the	most	because	there	are	the	local	elections,	then	for	five	years	you	only	pay	depending	on	what	they	do	for	you.	This	is	the	moment	I	invest	more	…	with	the	council
elections	…	we	spend	a	lot	of	money	for	the	city	council”.
As	reminded	in	the	Inquisitorial	Commission	by	the	prefect	of	Rome,	the	group	gained	power	mainly	after	the	election	of	the	previous	Mayor	of	Rome,	Gianni	Alemanno,39	 in	2008.	Access	to	 this	administration,	especially
through	Alemanno's	Chief	of	Staff,	allowed	placing	various	individuals	in	prominent	positions	out	of	common	interests,	thus	controlling	and	distorting	the	governance	of	the	capital	city	(Prefetto	di	Roma,	2015).	A	very	complex	group	of
relationships	between	the	companies	participated	by	Salvatore	Buzzi	and	other	entrepreneurs	close	to	the	group,	paired	with	a	systematic	distortion	of	public	tenders,	allows	the	influence	and	control	over	public	administration	of	the
capital	city.	When	the	political	landscape	changes,	Carminati	reminds	Buzzi40	that	it	is	necessary	to	find	a	way	in	the	new	administration:	“you	need	to	sell	the	product,	my	friend.	We	need	to	be	like	whores	now	(…)	put	on	your	miniskirt	and	go
hang	with	them”.	According	to	the	prosecutors,	the	poly-crime	nature	of	Mafia	Capitale	and	the	ability	to	use	corruption	to	access	the	political	and	entrepreneurial	nodes	of	the	capital	city,	shows	that	the	group	–	strong	because	of	a
criminal	reputation	and	intimidating	because	of	that	too	–	wants	to	acquire	not	just	profits	but	also	power	and,	as	mafia	groups	do,	profits	via	power.	According	to	the	Tribunal,	instead,	“it	is	not	proved	that	the	organisation	aiming	at	illegal
acquisition	of	public	contracts	derives	from	the	other	organisation	aimed	at	extortion	and	debt	collection	(…),	which	would	have	merged	with	the	first	one”.41
4.3	The	world-in-between
The	core	of	the	prosecutorial	thesis	is	that	what	links	the	underworld	and	the	upperworld	is	precisely	the	existence	of	the	unlikely	partnership	between	Carminati	and	Buzzi,	who	have	created	a	bridge,	a	world-in-between	the
street	and	politics.	It	is	only	by	locating	Carminati	and	Buzzi	in	the	world-in-between	that	Mafia	Capitale	becomes	one:	the	world-in-between	connects	the	two	otherwise	separated	criminal	groups.	It	is	the	autonomy	and	the	peculiar
character	of	the	world-in-between	that	the	Tribunal	has	to	dispute.	As	summarised	by	the	Antimafia	Commission	(Commissione	Parlamentare	Antimafia,	2016:	97):
“The	link	between	the	two	worlds	–	criminal	and	entrepreneurial	–	was	in	the	transversal	alliance	between	Massimo	Carminati,	from	the	extreme	right	wing	and	Salvatore	Buzzi,	head	of	an	important	group	of	companies	with	over	1300
stakeholders	(…)	The	companies,	the	acquaintances,	and	the	“clean	face”	of	Buzzi	together	with	the	criminal	prestige	of	Carminati	and	his	historical	links	with	the	far	right	in	Rome,	whose	members	in	the	years	gain	access	to	public
offices,	allowed	effects	no-one	else	could	have	achieved	but	them”.
The	opposite	political	views	and	the	different	personal	history	of	the	two	individuals	do	not	seem	to	be	of	any	obstacle	“in	their	common	purpose	of	seeking	 illicit	profits	 through	the	systemic	planning	of	 the	most	diverse	forms	of
influence	of	public	administration's	activities	in	the	capital	city	in	specific	sectors	of	interest”.42	Indeed,	the	most	worrying	result	of	the	partnership	between	Carminati	and	Buzzi	and	the	quick	escalation	of	their	criminal	group	is	in	their	co-
habitation	of	the	“world-in-between”	(Commissione	Parlamentare	Antimafia,	2016:	97):
“Buzzi,	 formally	 legitimised,	 for	his	activities,	 to	 interact	with	public	officials	and	politicians,	was	 the	official	channel	 through	which	 the	upperworld	 –	made	of	white	collars,	entrepreneurs	and	 institutions	–	 and	 the	underworld	with
Carminati	–	made	of	robbers,	drugs	and	arms	traffickers	–	could	meet	in	the	middle	and	stay	there”.
From	the	world	in	between,	the	group	can	use	corruptive	methods	in	the	upperworld,	while	the	reputation	of	the	consortium	in	the	underworld	acts	as	a	guarantee	for	–	and	intimidates	-	everyone:	should	things	not	work	out	in
the	upperworld,	should	someone	not	obey	the	group's	wishes	and	pacts,	 the	underworld's	reserve	of	violence	becomes	a	tool	 for	 intimidation.	 It	 is	a	 full	circle:	 the	ability	 to	corrupt	more	 is	based	both	on	the	success	of	previous
successful	attempts	to	corrupt	and	on	the	intimidation	resulting	from	the	growing	reputation	of	the	group	and	its	reserve	of	violence.	In-betweeners	like	Carminati	and	Buzzi	facilitate	flows	between	upperworld	and	underworld.	On	the
contrary,	 the	Tribunal	denies	 the	 importance	of	 the	world-in-between.	As	seen,	 the	Tribunal	does	not	consider	Carminati's	 ‘theory’	of	the	 ‘world	 in	between’	 as	a	manifesto	 for	 the	whole	organisation,	but	 rather	as	 recognition	of
Carminati's	own	position	alone	and,	therefore,	not	a	manifestation	of	the	mafia	method	for	the	whole	group.	Indeed,	says	the	Tribunal,	the	fact	that	Carminati	and	Brugia,	his	right-hand	man,	participated	to	the	businesses	 in	the
upperworld	with	Buzzi,	symbolises	their	willingness	to	move	towards	new	forms	of	crimes.
4.4	Mafia	methods:	intimidation	and	corruption
Because	of	the	difficulties	and	discrepancies	in	considering	the	unity	of	the	different	ties	that	make	Mafia	Capitale	a	single	organisational	structure,	the	main	divergences	between	the	prosecutors’	thesis	and	the	Tribunal	is
precisely	on	the	components	and	the	manifestations	of	the	mafia	method	within,	but	also	beyond,	the	modus	operandi	of	Mafia	Capitale.	The	core	of	this	debate	on	the	mafia	method	can	essentially	be	reduced	to	how	intimidation	of	a
mafia	groups	work	in	practice	and	whether	systemic	corruption	can	generate	intimidation	in	addition	to,	or	instead	of,	manifest	violence.
The	mafia	method,	as	said,	requires	three	main	ingredients:	the	intimidation	originated	from	the	strength	of	the	associative	bond,	the	subjection	and	omertà	generated	by	intimidation	on	externals	to	the	group,	and	the	pursuing
of	activities	for	financial	gain.	While	the	latter	is	not	contested	in	this	case,	intimidation	and,	consequently,	subjection/omertà	are.	Together	with	the	express	requirements	of	the	mafia	offence,	ancillary	concepts	such	as	the	control	of
the	 territory,	 reputation	and	 the	use	of	violence,	are	also	relevant	 to	discuss	 the	presence	of	 the	mafia	method.	These	are	also	 issues	 to	discuss	both	connections	and	differences	between	mafia	crimes	and	white	collar	crime,	as
historically,	Antimafia	law	has	struggled	to,	but	nevertheless	attempted,	to	employ	charges	for	the	mafia	method	against	the	grey	area	–	white	collar	criminals	and	professional	facilitators	of	organised	crime	(Martone,	2016b;	Sciarrone
and	Storti,	2016;	Mete	and	Sciarrone,	2016;	Sciarrone,	2016).
The	generation	of	intimidation	–	evidence	of	the	mafia	method	-	directly	linked	to	Mafia	Capitale	is	a	very	problematic	point	of	divergence	between	the	prosecutors	and	the	Tribunal.
As	Massimo	Carminati	says	while	talking	to	Riccardo	Brugia	about	some	“friendly”	entrepreneurs,43	the	main	interest	is	to	acquire	a	position	in	the	upperworld,	as	the	underworld	is	now	under	control:
“We	need	to	go	straight	to	the	point	…	they	have	to	be	our	executioners,	they	have	to	work	for	us	…	we	can't	do	things	like	we	used	to	…	arriving	afterwards	and	collecting	debts	(…)	We	are	not	interested	in	that	anymore	(…)	It	has	to	be	an
equal	partnership	…	you	have	to	tell	him	…	you	can	try	and	give	me	a	million	euros	to	take	care	of	all	of	this,	I	am	not	interested	(…)	it's	normal	that	from	our	friendship	comes	the	possibility	to	do	business	together,	that's	it.	(…)	Thing	is,
you	have	to	tell	him	-	to	whatshisname	–	in	the	streets	we	rule	…	someone	like	you	will	never	rule	in	the	street	…	in	the	street	you	will	always	need	us”.
According	to	the	prosecutors,	the	reputation	of	Carminati	in	the	underworld	has	various	effects	on	the	upperworld:	it	increases	the	prestige	of	the	organisation;	it	allows	this	prestige	to	intimidate	outsiders	to	the	group;	and	it
ensures	the	loyalty,	and/or	the	secrecy,	from	both	outsiders	and	insiders.	Through	a)	the	criminal	reputation	acquired	in	the	underworld	and	b)	the	willingness	to	step	up	onto	the	upperworld,	we	have	the	‘new’	organisation	in	the	world
in	between	that	is	Mafia	Capitale.	Mafia	Capitale,	according	to	the	prosecutors,	can	generate	intimidation	precisely	because	it	represents	the	union	point	of	underworld	and	upperworld,	the	former	guaranteeing	a	“reserve	of	violence”
and	the	latter	built	on	systemic	corruption.	Mafia	Capitale,	from	the	investigation,	appears	as	a	mafia-type	organised	system	of	corruption.	As	calrified	by	the	main	prosecutor	in	the	case44:
“The	mafia	offence	-	with	all	its	interpretative	problems	and	challenges	but	also	rich	in	its	symbolic	drives	and	its	revolutionary	approach	to	associative	crimes	across	different	legal	and	illegal	worlds	-	is	the	only	offence	“elastic”	enough	to
describe	what	essentially	is	the	mafia	method	through	organised	corruption	(…)	In	this	case	we	saw	this	group	using	the	mafia	method	to	maintain	their	systemic	corruption”.
This	peculiar	way	to	generate	intimidation	from	the	underworld	to	the	upperworld,	according	to	the	prosecutors,	but	not	to	the	Tribunal,	qualifies	the	mafia	method	as	it	is	similar	to	what	other	mafias	do:	generate	intimidation
through	the	potential	use	of	violence,	but	aiming	at	both	power	and	profits	at	higher	levels	via	different	forms	of	corruption.	As	noticed	by	the	prosecutors45:
“Because	of	 its	power	of	 intimidation	originating	from	the	associative	bonds	and	from	its	ability	to	cross	physical,	 institutional,	economic,	and	criminal	territories,	Mafia	Capitale	has	the	capacity	to	settle	equilibrium	and	create	illicit
synergies	between	very	different	worlds”.
Conversely,	the	Tribunal	endorses	a	conservative	view	of	how	intimidation	should	manifest	when	a	new	mafia	group	is	identified:
“For	unlawful	associations	not	originating	from	traditional	mafias,	it	is	necessary	to	verify	the	existence	of	acts	of	violence	and/or	threats	and	whether	these	acts	(…)	did	develop	an	aura	of	fear	around	the	group,	so	to	determine	subjection
and	omertà	while	allowing	the	organisation	to	reach	its	objectives	precisely	because	of	the	pre-established	reputation	of	violence”.46
As	said	above,	the	Tribunal	further	maintains	that	when	violence	is	only	residual	–	thus	threatened	but	not	manifest	–	the	group	is	not	a	mafia	group	unless	it	can	count	on	a	pre-existing	reputation	of	violence,	like	in	the	case	of
mafia	groups	migrating	 from	traditional	 territories	 (where	 the	reputation	 is	built)	 to	new	ones	 (where	reputation	 follows	 them).	 In	 the	case	of	Mafia	Capitale	 the	Tribunal	affirms	 that	“friendships	and	political	affinity,	not	mafia-type
intimidation,	better	describe	 this	context”,47	 implying	 that	corrupted	entrepreneurs,	politicians	and	administrators,	did	behave	 in	obedience	 to	 the	requests	of	 the	group	(in	particular	 the	one	 led	by	Buzzi)	not	because	of	mafia-style
intimidation	and	fear	of	violent	retaliation,	but	for	different	types	of	alliance	and	proximity	with	members	of	the	groups.	In	particular,	the	Tribunal	–	after	already	establishing	that	Mafia	Capitale	is	not	a	single	group	for	the	purposes	of
the	trial	-	establishes	that	acts	of	intimidation	in	this	case,	are	single	episodes	rather	than	referring	to	a	diffused	aura	of	fear,	as	they	are	put	in	place	by	individuals,	such	as	Carminati	or	his	closest	affiliates,	whose	individual	–	not
collective	–	reputation	is	what	intimidates,	temporarily	and	not	diffusely.
The	issue	surrounding	intimidation	is	further	complicated	by	the	revolutionary	interpretation	of	mafia-type	intimidation	in	the	prosecutorial	thesis.	The	prosecutors,	in	fact,	maintain	that,	the	power	of	intimidation	of	Mafia
Capitale	“does	not	have	a	privileged	physical,	institutional	or	social	territory,	but	it	is	felt	instantly	by	anyone	who	experiences	it”.48	The	prosecutors	reject	the	view	that	intimidation	must	be	connected	to	a	control	of	the	territory	-	when	it	comes
to	exist	because	and	through	systemic	corruption	-	while	the	Tribunal	considers	instead	that	having	control	of	a	physical	territory	still	remains	an	implicit	element	of	the	identification	of	a	mafia	association	because	it	is	on	the	territory
that	“the	power	of	the	association	and	its	capacity	to	create	subjection	and	omertà	can	be	best	measured”.49
The	Italian	Supreme	Court,	 in	two	instances	in	2015	(while	 judging	on	the	precautionary	measures	against	the	defendants)	 largely	confirmed	the	reading	of	Mafia	Capitale	by	the	Antimafia	Prosecutors,	for	the	purpose	of
admissibility	of	the	trial.	The	Supreme	Court	essentially	approved	an	expansive	reading	of	the	concept	of	intimidation	by	abandoning	a	strict	interpretation	of	both	control	of	territory	and	use	of	violence.	Said	the	Court50:
“Notwithstanding	the	association's	ability	to	resort	to	violence,	the	power	of	intimidation	can	be	acquired	with	the	creation	of	an	organisational	structure.	Because	of	its	proximity	with	political	actors,	through	repeated	usurpations	and
systemic	activities	of	corruption,	this	organisational	structure	can	influence	the	allocation	of	contracts	and	licensing,	and	can	control	entire	portions	of	public	works	and	public	companies,	so	to	determine	a	substantial	nullification	of
competition	and	a	frustration	of	any	new	initiative	that	does	not	obey	to	the	rules	of	the	association”.
According	to	the	Supreme	Court	therefore,	the	power	of	intimidation	can	indeed	originate	also	from	a	corruptive	method	and	from	the	reputation	of	the	leaders	that	is	transferred	to	the	organisation	and	can	generate	omertà
and	subjection	as	much	as	violence	could51:
“The	same	systemic	reiteration	of	activities	of	corruption,	on	one	side,	has	contributed	to	increment	the	criminal	“reputation”	of	the	organisation.	Especially	among	those	entrepreneurs	unwilling	to	comply	with	the	“rules”	of	the	illegal
market,	the	organisation	could	rely	upon	an	aura	of	invincibility	originating	from	a	wide	and	stable	supporting	group	made	of	subjugated	public	officials.	On	the	other	side,	the	systemic	use	of	corruption	has	been	functional	to	foster
relationships	of	omertà,	consolidated	through	blackmail	if	necessary	to	ensure	secrecy”.
The	 tension	between	a	progressive	and	a	conservative	conceptualisation	of	 the	mafia	method	could	not	be	more	visible:	 the	way	 in	which	 intimidation	 is	understood	 leaves	space	 to	opposite	views	on	how	mafias	actually
manifest	their	power,	generate	subjection	and	omertà	and	control	economy	and	spaces.	It	is	imperative,	however,	to	remember	that	intimidation	that	counts	on	the	reserve	of	violence	(the	availability	and	the	possibility	to	use	violence)
is	what	makes	mafia	organisations	distinct	phenomena	from	corruptive	groups,	a	distinction	that	the	law	has	to	maintain	very	clear	(Pignatone,	2018).
5	Discussion	and	conclusion
Even	though	in	the	Appeal	trial	the	prosecutorial	thesis	has	been	confirmed,	the	legal	battle	around	Mafia	Capitale	is	not	over	–	as	defence	lawyers	are	bringing	the	case	in	front	of	the	Supreme	court.	This	is	the	struggle	that	a
hard	case	–	deviating	from	consolidated	jurisprudence	just	enough	to	challenge	it	-	poses	to	the	requirements	of	the	Italian	mafia	membership	offence	(article	416-bis	of	the	Criminal	Code).	The	analysis	shows	how,	in	Mafia	Capitale	(as
a	hard	case),	legal	constructivism	of	the	mafia	concept	operates	through	the	negotiation	of	a	prudent	equilibrium	that	tends	to	avoid	the	expansion	of	the	norm.	This	is	necessary	and	justifiable,	as	noticed	already,	to	avoid	the	confusion
between	different	phenomena	–	mafia	and	corruption	–	that	must	remain	clearly	separated	to	avoid	abuse	of	sanctions	(Pignatone,	2018;	Lupo,	2014).
The	struggle	for	objectivity	of	the	law,	however,	and	the	struggle	for	reaching	the	‘one	right	answer’	that	the	system	asks	of	the	law	(Dworkin,	1986),	arguably	makes	all	mafia	trials	hard	cases,	because	of	the	complexity	of
shared	conclusions	in	these	matters	even	more	complex	than	before.	This	can	be	considered	a	direct	consequence	of	the	fact	that	the	mafia	offence	in	Italy	–	which	dates	back	to	1982	-	derives	from	a	mafia	concept	that	sociologists
and	criminologists,	in	Italy	and	in	the	USA	primarily,	have	constructed	since	at	least	1950s	(Dalla	Chiesa,	2010;	Sergi,	2017b);	the	mafia	offence	struggles	to	be	identified	without	certain	requirements	–	such	as	manifest	violence	and
control	of	the	territory	for	example	–	that	are	not	mentioned	in	the	actual	norm,	but	are	part	of	the	interpretation,	as	the	tribunal	in	Mafia	Capitale	has	confirmed.	As	seen	above	and	in	an	attempt	to	further	summarise	the	legal	battle,
the	main	interpretative	divergences	in	the	Mafia	Capitale	case	are	a)	the	recognition	of	the	group	as	a	single	organisation,	i.e.	a	debate	on	the	structure	of	mafia	groups	and	b)	the	recognition	of	systemic	corruption	as	viable	method	to
diffusely	and	collectively	intimidate,	i.e.	the	behaviours	of	mafia	groups.	In	both	cases,	sociological	and	criminological	discourses	on	both	mafias	(Lupo,	2014;	Sergi	and	Lavorgna,	2016)	and	corruption	(Vannucci,	2016,	2017)	appear	to
privilege	the	prosecutors'	interpretation	of	the	mafia	concept.	We	can	argue	that	if	we	accept	that	the	concept	of	mafia,	in	Italy	but	arguably	not	only	in	Italy,	cannot	fully	be	detached	from	its	sociological	connotations,	then	we	must
accept	that	the	evolution	of	sociological	connotations	–	as	explained	below	-	should	continue	to	influence	its	legal	construction.
It	is	well	accepted	in	academic	research	that	criminal	groups	can	be	extremely	fluid	if	needed,	but	this	fluidity,	or	liquidity	(Forgione,	2008),	does	not	imply	a	lack	of	organisational	compactness,	as	long	as	ties	are	strong	and
borders	and	relationships	with	others	are	flexible	enough	(Costa,	2017).	Criminal	groups,	even	when	extremely	fluid,	are	indeed	social	structures	and	as	such	can	become	lighter	forms	of	organisation	(Dalla	Chiesa,	2015;	Catino,
2019).	With	reference	to	mafia	groups,	contemporary	studies	have	 looked	at	 the	structure	of	 the	Calabrian	 ‘ndrangheta	 for	example,	reticular	and	cellular,	especially	when	the	clans	move	outside	their	 territories	and	also	abroad
(Sciarrone,	2014;	Sergi	and	Lavorgna,	2016;	Calderoni,	2012).	The	presence	of	specialisation	of	 labour,	 forms	of	direct	and	indirect	participation	of	affiliates,	as	well	as	the	different	roles	that	 individuals	play	 in	this	mafia,	do	not
undermine	its	being	an	organisation,	in	the	sense	of	having	a	corporate	entity	and	even	culture	(Pignatone	and	Prestipino,	2013;	Sergi,	2018).	Mafia	Capitale	is	also	a	group,	a	social	structure	of	power	with	intricate	relationships	that
becomes	organisation.
As	said,	in	organised	crime	studies,	the	successful	links	across	politics,	public	administration,	entrepreneurs	and	mafia	members	help	differentiate	between	mafia	groups	and	“other”	criminal	groups.	The	ability	to	create	and
foster	a	group	of	mildly	or	highly	influential	and	useful	contacts	in	both	the	underworld	and	the	upperworld,	through	the	effective	exploitation	of	different	types	of	social	ties	is	indeed	a	prerogative	of	mafia	groups	(Dalla	Chiesa,	2015;
Sergi,	2016b;	Lupo,	2011;	Paoli,	2004;	Sciarrone,	2011).	The	ability	to	link	heterogeneous	worlds	and	personalities,	in	the	case	of	criminal	groups,	brings	to	the	creation	of	new	opportunities	and	criminal	ventures	as	well	as	innovation
in	the	possibilities	and	opportunities	the	territory	offers.	However,	the	debate	on	the	nature	of	ties	 in	the	“grey	areas”	of	contiguity	between	mafia	and	the	legal	worlds	 is	 far	from	being	a	settled	one:	 independence	of	actors	and
activities	from	each	other	is	often	the	rule	and	ot	the	exception,	making	it	difficult	to	understand	the	organisational	setting	(Sciarrone	and	Storti,	2016).	In	Mafia	Capitale,	the	apparent	independence	between	actors	in	the	underworld
and	 in	 the	upperworld	 is	 key	 to	 the	 success	of	 the	group.	Like	other	mafia	groups	 (Von	Lampe	and	 Johansen,	2004;	Lupo,	2002;	 Allum,	 2016),	Mafia	Capitale	 enjoys	 functional	 forms	 of	 trust,	 not	 necessarily	 through	 everyone's
homogeneous	participation	and	blind	adherence	to	a	common	criminal	plan	–	but	rather	alternating	common	business	interests	to	old-style	gangsterism.	The	escalation	of	power	of	Mafia	Capitale	is	the	result	of	a	set	of	behaviours,
similar	to	other	mafias,	aimed	at	establishing,	maintaining	and	growing	the	group's	“criminal	reputations	in	the	legal	world	as	well	as	in	criminal	markets”	through	a	“stable	system	of	trafficking	of	favours”	(Sergi,	2017b:	301),	but	also
a	reserve	of	violence	that	can	never	be	forgotten	(Pignatone,	2018),	beyond	the	reputation	of	its	leaders.
The	systematic	and	strategic	use	of	corruption,	the	influence	over	the	public	and	private	sectors	and	politics	and	the	exploitation	of	privileged	channels	–	basically,	the	modus	operandi	of	Mafia	Capitale	as	described	by	the
prosecutors	–	is	also	commonly	observed	in	many	Southern	Italian	municipalities,	where	public,	political	and	mafia	roles	intertwine	and	overlap	and	are	directly	dependent	on	control	over	certain	channels	of	underworld	activities,
mainly	drugs	and	extortion	(Schneider	and	Schneider,	2003;	Sergi,	2015b;	Mete,	2011a,	2011b,	2013).	In	essence,the	difference	between	“traditional”	mafia	scenarios	and	Mafia	Capitale	lies	in	a)	the	lack,	in	Mafia	Capitale,	of	family-
blood	and	cultural	ties	typical	of	“traditional”	mafia	groups;	and,	b)	the	lack	of	manifest	violence	in	the	upperworld	to	generate	intimidation	and	omertà,	as	in	Mafia	Capitale	intimidation	operates	through	systemic	corruption	and
subsequent	impairment	of	rules	of	fair	competition.
Mafia	Capitale's	modus	operandi,	-	through	systemic	corruption	backed	up	by	potential	violence	if	the	underworld	is	involved	-	generates	intimidation	and	fear	precisely	because	it	reaches	a	monopolistic	grip	on	several	public
sectors	and	markets	in	the	city.	In	practice,	the	more	Mafia	Capitale	corrupts	successfully,	the	more	pervasive	the	group's	reputation	becomes	across	different	public	sectors,	the	more	those	in	the	field	will	know	of	Mafia	Capitale,	the
more	they	will	 fear	consequences	should	they	wish	to	escape	 involvement	with	Mafia	Capitale,	 the	more	 involved	or	even	complacent	 they	become,	 the	 less	 they	will	denounce	or	speak	against	 it:	 this	 is	 intimidation	that	creates
subjection	and	omertà,	 thus	a	protective	aura	around	the	group.	 Indeed,	 through	exchange	of	benefits	and	 favours	at	every	 level	and	 in	different	worlds,	Mafia	Capitale	can	count	on	an	 increasingly	 large	group	of	contacts.	This
cumulative	approach	is	typical	of	mafia	groups	and	their	behaviours,	whereby	proximity	to	politics	and	public	administration	is	symptomatic	of	the	growing	reputation	of	the	group	as	well	as	being	one	of	the	ultimate	goals	to	secure
power	and	money	(Sergi,	2017a;	Sergi	and	Lavorgna,	2016;	Allum,	2006;	Acconcia	et	al.,	2011).	Even	though	this	is	a	fair	and	logically	sound	interpretation	of	the	case,	it	must	be	remembered	that	in	the	debate	on	Mafia	Capitale	there
are	many	authorative	voices	that	see	the	case	not	as	an	‘ideal-type’	but	rather	as	a	one-of-a-kind	investigation	whose	traits	would	be	difficult	to	replicate	(Mete	and	Sciarrone,	2016;	Pignatone,	2018).	It	is	true,	however,	that	the	debate
on	the	nature	of	the	mafia	concept	remains	in	the	hands	of	jurisprudence	more	than	policy-makers,	thus	Mafia	Capitale	is	unlikely	to	remain	an	isolate	case	(Ciccarello,	2016).
In	 conclusion,	 as	 the	 legal	 constructivism	 prevailing	 in	 the	 Appeal	 trial	 confirmed	 the	 prosecutorial	 thesis	 thus	 recognised	 Mafia	 Capitale	 as	 a	 mafia	 group.	 In	 this	 view	 mafia-type	 organised	 crime	 includes	 a	 new
“symptomatology”,	which	is	based	on:	1)	the	existence	of	a	criminal	system	with	a	reputation	maintained	through	intimidation	via	corruption	with	a	reserve	of	violence;	2)	the	trafficking	of	illicit	favours	and	benefits	which	reinforces
the	reputation	of	the	group	and	increases	fear	of	repercussions	for	externals;	3)	the	reliability	on	in-betweeners,	or	brokers,	people	able	to	connect	underworld	an	upperworld,	from	armed	militia	to	entrepreneurs,	from	criminals	to
politicians;	4)	the	aims	of	pursuing	both	financial	gains	and	political	or	social	power.	This	revised	conceptualisation	of	a	mafia	group	would	separate,	without	denying,	the	idea	of	mafias	from	the	traditional	mafia	groups	linked	to	the
Southern	territories	of	Italy	and	would	advance	the	analysis	of	the	characteristics	of	the	mafia	phenomenon	as	a	dynamic	and	fluid	criminal	and	social	behaviour	detached	from	particular	cultures	and	ethnic	groups	and	that,	therefore,
can	exist	everywhere	and	are	not	just	an	Italian	peculiarity.
This	case	shows	that	while,	on	the	one	side,	corruption	could	be	considered	a	tool	through	which	mafias	establish	connections	and	cooperation	from	the	outside	world,	intimidation	by	a	mafia	group,	on	the	other	side,	can	and
should	be	seen	in	tight	connection	with	the	possibility	for	the	group	to	use	violence	as	that	remains	a	qualifying	behaviour	of	mafias.	Whether	or	not	the	Mafia	Capitale	would	become	a	paradigmatic	case	we	still	cannot	know.	Certainly,
this	case	already	brought	to	an	intriguing	reflection	on	the	divergences	between	mafias	in	the	criminal	code	and	in	the	academic	world	that	will	deeply	influence	further	research	in	this	field.
Appendix	A.	Supplementary	data
Supplementary	data	to	this	article	can	be	found	online	at	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2019.04.002.
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